
Sex Changes

*A Current Perspective
on the Psychology of Gender*

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As this volume attests, the psychology of gender comprises a rich array of topics pursued by top-notch researchers drawing on the latest theories and using the most sophisticated methodologies. The psychological study of gender has clearly come of age. No longer the concern of a handful of researchers, the psychology of gender embraces researchers from across the domain of psychology. No longer regarded as an upstart or an area of questionable legitimacy, the study of the psychology of gender is now accepted as a serious scholarly pursuit. No longer viewed as stridently political, the psychology of gender has entered the scientific mainstream. But all this expansion, acceptance, and growing coherence should not be taken to mean that all the issues prompting the rise of the field have now been settled.

In what follows, we discuss several issues that were instigated by the chapters in this volume. These issues, however, are not unique to these chapters but, we believe, have applicability across the domain of the psychology of gender. Specifically, we draw attention to four issues. First, we look at the changes in content of the psychology of gender, specifi-

cally, with reference to observing the increased presence of theory, the greater prevalence of biology, and the diminution of feminist politics. Second, we take a close look at terminology in order to determine whether word choice provides information about the tacit belief systems that continue to link *sex* with biological processes and *gender* with sociocultural processes. Third, we note the persistence of between-sex comparisons, which continue to be the central focus in general for psychologists interested in gender. Finally, we reiterate the point that because gender processes necessarily operate in conjunction with other social categories (e.g., race, class, and age), investigators should attend more to these and other situation and group interactions.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER: PAST AND PRESENT

The psychology of gender today subsumes a diverse collection of topics, questions, methods, and political underpinnings. Everything from hormonal and genetic influences on sex differences to societal conditions affecting gender inequality is included. This second edition of *The Psychology of Gender* mirrors this far-ranging collection of topics. For example, Hampson and Moffat (Chapter 3) ask how reproductive hormones affect sex differences in behavior, and answer the question by drawing on evidence from both animal and human studies. Ridgeway and Bourg (Chapter 10) examine the ways that gender-linked status beliefs create power inequities between men and women, and investigate these links with social psychological experiments.

Perspectives and Trends

As the field of the psychology of gender has expanded, so too have the attempts to characterize how it has developed (e.g., Banaji, 1993; Crawford & Marecek, 1989; Deaux, 1984; Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Unger, 1998, 2001; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Most researchers agree that the earliest tack taken by psychologists in the study of gender focused on the ways that men and women differ or are similar to each other. At least early on, this approach sometimes led to seeing women as a problem, and somewhat later it led to seeing women as special (Crawford & Marecek, 1989). The “woman as problem” focus documented the ways in which women appeared to be deficient relative to men. For example, researchers in achievement motivation sought to understand why women have a “fear of success” (Horner, 1972). Gilligan’s (1984) description of women’s unique ethic of care exemplifies the

“woman as special” focus, in which women’s noteworthy characteristics were given special attention. Regardless of how women were seen relative to men, the common thread was an emphasis on sex comparisons.

The second major perspective emerged in the 1970s, when psychologists began to conceptualize gender as multidimensional rather than binary. Masculinity and femininity were conceptualized as two independent sets of psychological traits rather than as opposite ends of a single scale (Bem, 1974). Studies in this area distinguished sex-typed people (e.g., self-described masculine males and feminine females) from more androgynous people (e.g., males and females who identified themselves as both masculine and feminine). The aim was to demonstrate that androgyny might be a way out of the problems associated with bipolar measurements of masculinity and femininity then in use. For conceptual and methodological reasons, androgyny has not lived up to its initial promise. For example, the measurement of masculinity and femininity was found to be somewhat unreliable because of shifting ideas of what constituted typical male and female characteristics. Moreover, androgynous individuals were not consistently found to be healthier psychologically than sex-typed individuals (see Hoffman & Borders, 2001). Bell (Chapter 7) touches on similar issues when she considers individuals who are uncomfortable with their sex.

The research on androgyny nonetheless showed that masculinity and femininity were differentially valued and that the evaluations varied with the contexts in which they took place. Attention thus turned to seeing sex as a stimulus variable. In other words, researchers began to investigate people’s stereotypes of males and females as social categories. Reflecting this substantial shift in focus (Deaux, 1984), the “psychology of women,” as it was typically known, was renamed the “psychology of gender” as researchers began to concentrate on how gender is perceived and enacted (Crawford & Marecek, 1989). In this volume, gender as social category is reflected by Ridgeway and Bourgeois’s (Chapter 10) study of people’s different expectations for men and women. It also shows up in Pomerantz, Ng, and Wang’s (Chapter 6) discussion of how parents’ gender-based expectations influence their treatment of sons and daughters.

Most recently, some psychologists have begun to challenge the prevailing assumptions, methods, and values of the positivist take on the psychology of gender. Maracek, Crawford, and Popp (Chapter 9) provide a vigorous endorsement of this social constructivist perspective on the understanding of gender. A constructivist stance has gathered adherents on both sides of the Atlantic, yet it appears to have more support in Europe and the United Kingdom than in the United States.

Although we have described these four perspectives as though the later ones have subsumed or replaced the earlier ones, a truer description

is that all four perspectives continue to have their adherents, not only in this volume but in the psychology of gender as a whole.

What's New in This Volume?

Twenty years ago, Deaux (1984) urged researchers to develop better theories to explain the processes and mechanisms underlying the psychology of gender. If this volume is any indication, psychologists have heeded her advice. Several chapters present theoretically derived research programs. Social role theory (Eagly, Wood, & Johannesen-Schmidt, Chapter 12), parent \times child interaction theory (Pomerantz et al., Chapter 6), evolutionary psychological theory (Kenrick, Trost, & Sundie, Chapter 4), social cognitive theory (Bussey & Bandura, Chapter 5), and expectation states theory (Ridgeway & Bourg, Chapter 10) all constitute well-developed, empirically supported models of gender-related behavior.

Besides the greater salience of theory, this volume also places greater emphasis on biology than the previous edition (Beall & Sternberg, 1993). Three chapters stress biological processes (Hampson & Moffat, Chapter 3; Hines, Chapter 2; Kenrick et al., Chapter 4), whereas three others incorporate biological components into their models (e.g., Bussey & Bandura, Chapter 5; Eagly et al., Chapter 12; Pomerantz et al., Chapter 6). Previously, some gender psychologists were reluctant to incorporate biological aspects. The concern (to use the familiar refrain) was that biology signaled destiny, that is, the biological processes would be used to explain inequality between the sexes. Indeed, there is legitimacy in this concern, because biological explanations for psychological sex differences have been used to bolster unequal treatment of women (Bleier, 1984; Fausto-Sterling, 1985; Hubbard, 1989).

So why is biology more prevalent in this second edition, and in the psychology of gender generally? Partly it is because researchers now recognize that gender-correlated biological processes are flexible, and not fixed elements that explain the origins of sex differences (Rogers, 1999). Biological processes are now viewed as both effects and causes of gender-related behavior. For example, research shows that testosterone levels vary as a function of situation. Specifically, sports fans' testosterone levels increase when their team wins and decrease when their team loses (Bernhardt, Dabbs, Fielden, & Lutter, 1998).

In addition to the increased presence of theory and the greater inclusion of biology, this edition also provides more room for the concepts of power and status. The previous volume barely acknowledged the role of power, whereas several chapters are devoted to its explication in this second edition. Chapters on expectation states theory (Ridgeway &

Bourg, Chapter 10), social role theory (Eagly et al., Chapter 12), social constructivism (Marecek et al., Chapter 9), and a gendered power perspective (Pratto & Walker, Chapter 11) all address why men have more social, economic, and political power than women do. A recurrent theme is that equalization of power between men and women would have the effect of substantially reducing sex differences.

Politics in the Psychology of Gender

Politics has been present since the beginning of a psychology of gender. In the first edition of this volume, Beall and Sternberg (1993) observed that “few fields of study have such political overtones as the study of gender” (p. xix). Although political views affect all research programs, they are seldom explicitly acknowledged as such. The exception has been the psychology of gender, in which many psychologists have acknowledged their debt to feminist politics. Feminist politics, specifically a concern with dismantling sexist practices, generated the field that has come to be known as the psychology of gender. One might even argue that the psychology of women and gender would not exist as a distinct area were it not for feminism. The field began by challenging the notion that women are inherently inferior. Subsequently, responding to calls from feminists, psychologists took up social problems such as rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment (Koss et al., 1994).

For many psychologists, the concern with gender centers on social issues. The American Psychological Association’s involvement in the *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins* sex discrimination case illustrates how a research basis can be used to influence important legal and policy issues (Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Heilman, 1991). When the Supreme Court heard this case, psychologists testified on the role of stereotypes and gender expectations. Hopkins eventually prevailed, in part because of input from psychological research. Research on rape by gender psychologists has also contributed to public policy. For example, Koss’s congressional testimony on the factors affecting the incidence of and reactions to rape contributed to the passing of the Violence Against Women Act (Award for Distinguished Contribution, 2000).

This volume devotes rather little explicit attention to politics and social policy implications, although the social constructivist and gendered power perspectives are clear exceptions. The emphasis throughout this volume is on documenting new developments in basic theory and research. The authors have responded by describing the current state of knowledge in several topics. It might be the case, as Unger (1998) has argued, that a greater focus on theory building sometimes results in a decreased application of research to practical issues. Since the

best policy and intervention recommendations come from a solid understanding of the processes and mechanisms involved, we look forward to subsequent descriptions of how research findings on topics such as those represented here might be put to use. Application may yet re-emerge as an important element in the field as its scientific credentials are acknowledged.

GENDER TERMS

In the history of the psychology of gender, terminology has been an area of disagreement among social scientists (Nicholson, 1994). Although some perceive language disputes as distracting, issues of wording are important to a complete psychology of gender. Terminology is important because inconsistently used or under-defined labels hamper the development of a coherent and cumulative body of work. Social constructivists go further by arguing that linguistic terms significantly construct and constrain what we know or think we know. Consequently, if language changes, so too does our understanding of the phenomena we study. For example, when people read about a “sex difference,” they typically assume that it is more rooted in biology than one described as a “gender difference” (Pryzgodna & Chrisler, 2000).

The field known today as the psychology of gender began with no mention of gender—only sex. Sex was generally understood to mean identities rooted in bodily differences that were believed to significantly affect traits, abilities, and interests regarded as “masculine” or “feminine.” The terms *gender* and *gender identity* were invented to describe individuals’ outward manifestations of and attitudes toward their status as males or females (Hooker, 1993; Money, 1955; Stoller, 1964; Unger, 2001). Terms like *gender-typical* and *sex-identified* were coined to acknowledge variation in what the psychological attributes attributed to being male or female. The distinction between *sexual harassment* and *gender harassment* made in Chapter 11 of this volume points to two different kinds of hazards for working women. The former term stresses the kind of harassment that comes from sexual coercion, while the latter focuses on hostile working conditions imposed on people because they are deemed to be the wrong sex in a particular environment. All this expansion of terminology has the effect of alerting researchers to possible ideological and social structural underpinnings for the differences between males and females. In particular, it has allowed psychologists interested in changing male–female inequality to think about differences as part of a dynamic, socioculturally based gender system rather than simply a biologically based sex system.

New terms such as *gender role*, *sex-typical*, *sex-typed*, *gender performance*, *gender identity*, *sex category*, *sexual preference*, *biologically assigned sex*, and *sex-identifier* have also come to be used because of the need to recognize and investigate the increasingly complex domain subsumed by the psychology of gender (see West & Zimmerman, 1987). Terminology describing the concept of sexual orientation, specifically, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered people (LGBT), opened up new areas of research and theory on the relationships between and among sex, gender, and sexuality. Consider the term *transgendered*, which does not refer to lesbian, gay, or bisexual individuals, but rather to people whose appearance and/or sexual behavior runs contrary to their identification as male or female. For example, it can include cross-dressers as well as individuals who self-describe as “butch” or “fem.”

In short, terms have developed in order to deal with the nonequivalence among sex, gender, and sexual orientation. The expanded vocabulary has in turn prompted questions about methodology and statistical analyses. For example, on what bases should we measure sex, gender, and sexuality? Eagly et al. (Chapter 12, this volume) use the concept “socially identified sex,” which indicates that assessment of someone’s “sex” usually draws on social appearances rather than some biological or physical criterion. Theoretical models, in turn, are articulating how sex, gender, and sexuality interrelate, as it is now clear that sex does not necessarily provide information about gender or sexuality.

This volume shows this diversity of new terminology, but—as in the field more generally—identical terms sometimes reflect different meanings, and different terms sometimes reflect similar usage. For example, some authors use *sex* and *gender* interchangeably to convey that they regard the association of sex with nature and gender with nurture as not yet determined. Others, while not explicitly saying so, appear to link *sex* differences with biological correlates and *gender* differences with sociocultural ones.

The *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (2002) does not specify when authors are to use the term *sex* instead of *gender* and vice versa, but instructs investigators to “avoid ambiguity in sex identity or sex role by choosing nouns, pronouns, and adjectives that specifically describe participants” (p. 66). In the *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, Eagly (2000) argued that the labels *sex differences* and *gender differences* should both be considered correct, given that little consensus exists regarding distinctions between them.

We have examined terminological practices in this volume to see whether the various chapter authors have adopted a common language with respect to sex and gender. Because the volume is titled *The Psychology of Gender*, it is not surprising that the majority of chapters include

the word *gender* in their titles. Does this mean that the authors deal primarily with sociocultural rather than biological mechanisms, as might be understood by readers not well initiated into the nuances of the field's terminology (Pryzgodna & Chrisler, 2000)? Clearly it does not. What does seem to be the case is that authors who stress biological variables tend to use *sex* more often than *gender*, while authors who stress social variables and explanations tend to employ *gender* more often than *sex*.

In our examination of this book's chapters, we counted four categories of terms. *Sex* terms and *gender* terms constituted two categories. For example, *sex-typed* was included in the *sex* category, and the adjective *gendered* was counted in the *gender* category. The third category, namely *sexual* terms, included words such as *sexual* and *sexuality*, and the fourth category comprised terms describing sexual orientation (e.g., *bisexual*, *lesbian*, *gay*, *heterosexual*, and *homosexual*). The *sexual* and *sexual orientation* language categories appear relatively infrequently in the book, so our analysis will focus primarily on the first two groups of terms.

Not surprisingly, the chapter on evolutionary theory (Kenrick et al., Chapter 4) and the two chapters describing hormonal processes (Hines, Chapter 2; Hampson & Moffat, Chapter 3) employ the greatest proportion of *sex* terms (60–80% of all terms used in our categories). In contrast, chapters with a more social contextual emphasis use proportionally more *gender* terms. The chapter on gender development by Bussey and Bandura (Chapter 5) uses *gender* terms most often, followed in turn by Gardner and Gabriel (Chapter 8), Bell (Chapter 7), Ridgeway and Bourg (Chapter 10), Best and Thomas (Chapter 13), and Pratto and Walker (Chapter 11) (59–89% of all terms in our categories). Interestingly, the chapters by Eagly et al. and Pomerantz et al. (Chapters 12 and 6, respectively), both of which explicitly incorporate both biological and social processes into their explanations, use equivalent proportions of *sex* terms (47% and 45%, respectively) and *gender* terms (52% and 50%, respectively). For example, in the Eagly et al. chapter (Chapter 12), comparisons between males and females are described as *sex* differences and the social environmental processes that moderate these are described in *gender* terms. Although most researchers in the psychology of gender now eschew the simple equation of *sex* with biology and *gender* with social context, readers of the literature still need to be alert to subtle associations implied by *sex* and *gender* terms. At least for the moment, we have no single term that clearly conveys the idea that both biology and social context are simultaneously implicated whenever gender matters are discussed.

We also took note of whether the authors of these chapters conceptualized sex and/or gender as binary and mutually exclusive. For exam-

ple, in two chapters that used more *sex* category than *gender* category terms, namely, Chapter 4 on evolutionary theory and Chapter 3 on reproductive hormones, the authors also use the term *opposite sex*. This term clearly entails a view of sex as a dichotomous and mutually exclusive category. But to show that the use of sex does not always imply a dichotomous classification, Hines (Chapter 2) also uses *sex* frequently but introduces the idea of *intersexed* individuals, which by definition avoids implications of mutual exclusivity. Interestingly, most of the chapters that use a greater proportion of *gender* terms also construe gender as binary, despite the priority they give to social contextual influences. The exception is Chapter 7, which discusses current psychoanalytic theories of gender and in which Bell proposes a “multiplicity of genders.”

As noted above, sexual orientation appears rarely in this volume, appearing to substantiate Kitzinger’s (1994) claim that sexual orientation research constitutes a peripheral area within gender psychology (Kitzinger, 1994). For example, Kenrick et al. (Chapter 4) describe sex behavior in exclusively heterosexual terms, and some other word choices appear to reinforce a marginal status for non-heterosexual people. Hines (Chapter 2) uses the term *homosexual* against the advice of the American Psychological Association’s publication manual, which recommends “gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals” as the more precise, less stigmatizing terms. Pratto and Walker (Chapter 11) follow the manual’s recommended practice. Bell (Chapter 7) and Marecek et al. (Chapter 9) use the more political term, *queer*, which questions a simple heterosexual-homosexual dichotomy. The social constructivist chapter (Chapter 9), the one most preoccupied with terminology, uses the term *spectrum person* to convey the range, rather than the dichotomy, of sexual orientation.

As is probably evident by now, terminology is central to the understanding of the psychology of gender. This volume shows how the language has grown to keep pace with the ever-evolving set of constructs in the field. It also occasionally reveals an ambiguity in the use of some terms, which is similarly true of the field as a whole. Investigators and readers alike need to be attentive to the selection of terms because of their implied or indeterminate meanings.

EMPHASIZING SEX COMPARISONS

As noted earlier, the psychology of gender was once nearly synonymous with sex comparisons. In its most elementary form, this approach focuses on whether, and to what degree, the sexes differ or are similar in any number of psychological attributes such as hormonal responses, physical capa-

bilities, cognitive faculties, personality traits, social inclinations, styles of communication, and so forth. Although there has been concerted movement away from simple sex comparisons, this volume shows that sex comparisons still tend to dominate the psychology of gender.

The focus on sex comparisons is so entrenched in the fabric of psychology that the subject area “human sex differences” generates over 50,000 citations just for work published since 1974. For many, this focus makes good sense and constitutes a much needed balancing of psychology’s early subject matter, which for too long equated psychology as a whole with the psychology of men. A similar rebalancing is now under way in medicine. A recent report from the Institute of Medicine (2001), *Exploring the Biological Contributions to Human Health: Does Sex Matter?*, answered the question in the affirmative. Sex matters, specifically sex differences matter. According to the authors of this report, sex is a basic human variable. Because “every cell has a sex” and “the scientific importance of sex differences throughout the life span abounds,” the authors state emphatically that effort should be directed at “understanding sex differences and determinants at the biological level” (p. 20). They recommend that sex be included in the design and analysis of “studies in all areas and at all levels of bio-medical and health related research” (2001, p. 20). From one viewpoint, this call to incorporate sex comparisons is laudable, because diseases and their treatments do sometimes vary depending on a person’s sex. Nonetheless, the breadth of such a focus could inadvertently generate a whole new set of problems that we describe in more detail in the section entitled Problems with Sex Comparisons.

This volume also devotes considerable coverage to sex comparisons, although many chapters add important moderating factors to the mix. The kinds of comparisons can be roughly grouped into those that concentrate on showing that men and women have “different bodies,” or that they encounter “different worlds,” or that they are located in a social system that structurally affords men and women “different power and status.”

Several chapters focus on the sexes having “different bodies,” but the particular physical features being described vary greatly. Hines (Chapter 2) examines the influences of gonadal hormones on human brain development and behaviors such as childhood play preference and cognitive abilities. Hampson and Moffat (Chapter 3) review evidence pertaining to the idea that estrogen and androgen modulate cognitive functions in women and men, respectively. For Kenrick et al. (Chapter 4) a “different bodies” perspective takes the form of presenting the idea that the sexes possess different genetic endowments. Specifically, they argue that sex differences in aggressiveness, within-sex competition, and

sexual behavior are the result of gradual changes in male and female genetics acquired over generations.

Authors of several other chapters emphasize the idea that males and females tend to encounter “different worlds.” Chapters by Bussey and Bandura (Chapter 5) and by Pomerantz et al. (Chapter 6) contend that gender differentiation is the result of societal gender typing via the actions of parents, teachers, and peers, although the latter chapter shows how actions by children interact with those by parents to produce sex differences. Bell (Chapter 7) draws from a psychoanalytic perspective to show how people develop a gendered self in response to input from family members and other early caregivers. Eagly et al. (Chapter 12) explicitly contend that sex differences are the result of having different bodies and encountering different worlds. Different worlds show up in both distal environmental factors (e.g., sex-typed socialization) and proximal factors (occupational demands and self-regulatory processes) that impinge on the fact that males and females have different reproductive organs.

In both the “different bodies” and “different worlds” perspectives, the focus is on how individuals come with a gendered-self or develop one. Two chapters, Pratto and Walker (Chapter 11) and Ridgeway and Bourg (Chapter 10), begin with the observation that women and men are assigned to unequal *positions of power*. The “different positions-of-power” perspective stresses the idea that people have different expectations for males and females simply on the basis of sex determination. Such expectations result in different opportunities, evaluations, and behavior.

Problems with Sex Comparisons

The conspicuous weight given to sex comparisons in this volume is familiar to any psychologist who studies gender. Although many of the chapters approach sex comparisons in a more sophisticated way than has previously been the case in psychological approaches to gender, it is nonetheless useful to articulate some of the concerns that sex comparison approaches have spawned in general (Bem, 1993; Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Kitzinger, 1994). First, critics argue that a focus on sex differences within the psychology of gender can obscure the much larger reality of overlap between the sexes.

Second, perspectives that emphasize sex comparisons sometimes overlook the dissimilarities within each sex. One consequence of this is the neglect of other individual differences that may matter a good deal more in predicting behavior (e.g., age, race, culture, social class, health, experience, and education). For example, a recent cross-cultural investigation of beliefs about love and romantic relationships found cultural

differences matter a good deal more than do gender differences (Sprecher & Toro-Morn, 2002). In addition, studies that include other dimensions, along with sex, are commendable in that they allow us to evaluate the importance of sex differences and not just their existence. Statistical techniques such as meta-analyses aim to do just this.

Third, critics charge that concentrating on sex differences can produce gender polarization, which tends to force any psychological attribute into mutually exclusive male and female forms, with the result that the sexes are implicitly, if not explicitly, conceived as “opposites.” As noted previously, two chapters in this volume employ the phrase *opposite sex*. Gardner and Gabriel (Chapter 8) make a distinction between two types of social interdependence and report that women rely more on relational aspects of the social self, whereas men evidence more group-based aspects of the social self. Although these are described as relative differences, it is rather easy to conclude, given the relative dearth of information about variability within and between the sexes, that males and females are consistently and largely different in their relational orientation. Our concern is that once the sexes are seen as dissimilar, the probability goes down that there will be interested in searching for within-sex variation and/or variability across contexts. Chapters by Eagly et al. (Chapter 12) on social role theory and Pratto and Walker (Chapter 11) on the bases of gendered power are useful counterexamples. Both deal explicitly with the effect of situational factors in moderating the size of sex differences in psychological behavior.

Despite the concerns we have described, several factors conspire to make sex differences a continued focus for psychologists interested in gender. Psychologists sometimes take their lead from cumulative wisdom about the extent to which women and men are born different or become so. In response, at least one psychologist has proposed relinquishing the study of sex differences altogether (Baumeister, 1988), although his interest has subsequently turned to how the sexes differ in sexual behavior (Baumeister, 2000; Baumeister, Catanese, & Vohs, 2001). Others counter that it is only by studying the sexes—sometimes finding few, weak, or no differences, and other times finding significant differences—that researchers will be persuaded to understand when and why the sexes differ, and not merely whether they do (Eagly, 1987).

A psychology of gender needs to be alert to complexities rather than polarities, as many chapters in this volume have done. On the methodological side, this entails heeding a number of suggestions: Reporting effect sizes when sex differences are described is essential. Hines (Chapter 2), for example, cites mean effects from others' meta-analyses. It means employing multiple-factor designs and looking for

interactions with sex, as Best and Williams have done on the interactions of sex with culture in Chapter 13. Conceptually, it means considering sex as a process, as Pratto and Walker (Chapter 11) have done in their discussion of the interaction of sex with power. It means unpacking the constructs “male” and “female,” as several chapters here have done, to determine what about them is predicted to be the cause or the result of other processes. Most crucially, it means *not* reducing the psychology of gender to a search for sex differences. To do so can conceal rather than reveal what is important about the gender and its psychological ramifications.

SEX AND OTHER SOCIAL CATEGORIES

Although the psychology of gender originally developed in response to psychology’s male-centered bias, it soon became clear that the psychology of gender has also had its own problems of exclusion. Psychology of gender researchers have, until recently, largely ignored how gender interacts with race (Greene et al., 1997), sexual orientation (Rothblum & Cole, 1988), disability (Fine & Asch, 1988), and social class (Reid, 1993).

As outlined earlier, concentrating on sex differences and ignoring other group differences tends to obfuscate factors that may better explain many psychological phenomena. At the very least, examining differences among groups of women and men may help untangle the relative influence of sociocultural and biological factors on sex differences, because society exposes different groups to different experiences. For instance, white women do not experience sex discrimination in the same way as African American women, given that the former are privileged because of their skin color (MacIntosh, 1987). Similarly, sex discrimination likely takes different forms and has different effects depending on race, age, social class, and sexual orientation (Hurtado, 1992). In this volume, the expectation states approach (Ridgeway & Bourg, Chapter 10) and the gendered power approach (Pratto & Walker, Chapter 11) specifically combine other factors such as race, class, sexual orientation with gender processes. According to Marecek et al. (Chapter 9), the connections among biology, physical appearance, social roles, and sexual orientation may be neither stable nor universal.

Toward a More Inclusive Psychology of Gender

Although no psychologist, to our knowledge, explicitly disagrees with the contention that race, class, sexual orientation, and age matter in understanding the psychology of gender, research in the psychology of gen-

der as a whole, and in this volume, is often conducted with samples of convenience. With the exception of research that requires “special” populations, such as women with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (Hines, Chapter 2) or international populations (Best and Thomas, Chapter 13) or children (Pomerantz et al., Chapter 6), college students are often the samples of choice. The problem is they tend to be more educated and literate, more financially secure, and more likely to speak English, even in countries outside the United States.

Consequently, we still know less about gender-related behavior among people who have low incomes or who are immigrants, middle-aged, or elderly. Even outside the United States, researchers use samples of convenience. See, for example, results described by Best and Thomas (Chapter 13), in which an international comparison used participants who attending college in their respective countries.

Samples of convenience in the study of gender-related behavior are a concern, then, because they are unique in a number of respects and may seem more typical and representative than they are and less in need of explanation (Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). Other samples may seem distinctive or applied just because they are less familiar. In addition, research psychologists as a group may, like other scientists and professors, lack the “standpoint” of personal experience with diversity. At the least, this fact should prompt the exercise of care in interpreting results with nontypical samples. Interpretations of the meaning of gender-related behavior may vary with the group being studied; hence, members of the group in question should be consulted (Harding, 1991).

To address concerns about “standpoint,” more diversity within academia at the undergraduate, graduate, and faculty levels is likely to bring different perspectives to psychological research on gender. Although it is not the responsibility of gay and lesbian, disabled, racial minority, and working-class investigators to initiate more research and knowledge on diverse groups, the heightened visibility of these individuals in psychology departments would make their identities and group issues more salient and familiar to psychologists.

CONCLUSIONS

Psychologists have discovered that sex and gender matter, and have made discernible inroads into describing when, how, and why that is the case. The chapters in this volume demonstrate how much the field has grown. It has expanded to include biological processes as well as sociological ones. It has become encompassing with respect to methodology and now actively entertains and tests sophisticated theoretical models.

The growth has been such that psychologists across the discipline are now more likely to incorporate gender issues into their research and applications, and gender psychologists are bringing the theories and methods of other areas to bear on gender questions.

This second edition of the *The Psychology of Gender* shows how varied and influential this field has become. Consequently, one suspects that it will be harder in the next edition to capture in a mere thirteen chapters what this volume has done.

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